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ABSTRACT
The work reported herein is a continuation of a previous
program of testing an experimental hydrazine electrolysis
cell. The purpose of this program was to investigate the
performance of the electrolysis cell at extreme conditions
of voltage, current, and temperature to determine if any
controllability problems existed. Early in the planned
test program a failure which destroyed the electrolysis
cell was experienced. The subsequent failure investi-
gation indicated that the probable cause was thermal
decomposition, due to local hot spot on the cathode
screen.
0
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INTRODUCTION
This report summarizes the work performed under Tasks VII
and VIII of JPL Contract 951720 during the period of
1 Aeril to 29 may 1969. This effort was a continuation
of the hydrazine electrolysis experimental work conducted
under Task V of the same contract during 1968, and had as
its objectives:
Determine if a controllability problem
exists.
Determine the effects of a short circuit
in the electrolysis cell.
The previous work under Task V consisted of design,
fabrication, and test of a full scale experimental
hydrazine electrolysis cell.. That test program was
devoted primarily to characterizing the cell performance
and identifying problem areas. At the end of Task V,
questions of electrolysis cell operating safety limits
and controllability remained unanswered. Hence, the
contract was ammended to include Tasks VII and VIII
which involved exploration of cell, performance at
extreme off-design conditions. This work was performed
using the same electrolysis cell which had been built
and successfully tested for over 950 hours in Task V.
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SUMMARY
The experimental hydrazine electrolysis cell, previously built
and tested under Task V, was thoroughly cleaned and re-assembled
for the test program described in this report. Aside from a new wick,
new electrical insulation material., and new o-rang seals, the cell
consisted of the same parts as previously tested.
To demonstrate adequate structural integrity, the tank shell was
proof tested at 3000E and `(50 psig. After assembly of the electro-
lysis cell and leak testing it and the test set-up, the first series
of electrolysis tests was started. In accordance with the test plan,
these tests were to consist of electrolysis of neat hydrazine (no
electrolyte) up to 60 volts, with the liquid at three different
levels in the tank.
y with the tank 90 percent
for the purpose of deter-
several voltages up to 60
a linear voltage-current
value for the cell that
The first test was a voltage-current surve,
full of neat hydrazine (10 percent ullage)
mining the cell current characteristics at
volts. The results of this test indicated
trace. It also indicated a low resistance
went unnoticed at the time.
The second test consisted of over 5 hours of electrolysis with the
tank still 90 percent full of neat hydrazine. of this operating time,
100 minutes was at 60 volts, ^-aith most of the remaining time at 40 and
50 volts. During this test, two current surges were detected. One
was noticed in time to reduce power, but the other trapped a 1 5 ampere
circuit breaker. The cell, resistance dropped to 2 ohms before apparently
shorting out. Subsequent analysis of the test data showed a greater
increase in pressure than could be accounted for by electrolytic gas
generation and cell temperature rise. It is believed that this ex-
cessive pressure rise was caused by thermal decomposition resulting
from a local hot-spot on the cathode screen. The hot-spot resulted
from high power dissipation across a near short area.
Prior to the third test, half of the propellant was removed from
the tank, leaving it 4.5 percent full of neat ,hydrazine (55 percent
ullage). The test consisted of a voltage-current survey up to 60 volts
similar to the first test. Cell operation appeared normal as voltage
was increased stepwise to 60V, then down to 20V. At 20V rapidly
rising temperatures were observed, immediately .followed by rupture of the
tank and destruction of the electrolysis cell,,
A thorough failure investigation was conducted for various failure
modes which are discussed in the following sections of this report.
The most probable failure mode was concluded to be thermal decomposition7
resulting from a local hot spot on the cathode screen above the liquid
level of the 45 percent load. Without the propellant acting as a partial
heat sink, the hot spot on the screen was able to get out of control.
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The failure investigation also included a review of special elevated
temperature and current tests conducted ors the NASA Goddard ►';ydrazine
electrolysis flight experiment. The flight experiment passed the
1400F ambient test due to its improved thermal design. A current
limiter in the circuitry prevents the unit from ever seeing above
I ampere thus the flight experiment was found non-susceptible to the
type of failure experienced in this program. Test details are
present later,
NCONCLUSIONS
Controllability
To maintain control of gas ,generation at high power levels, proper thermal
management and cathode design for that power level muse be designed into
the electrolysis cell,
Cause of Failure
The results of the failura investigation points to thermal decomposition
resulting from local heating on the cathode screen as the most likely
failure mode.
The source of the failure is probable loose wares on the edge or bottom
of the screen penetrating the fiberglass.
W
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TEST DESCRIPTION
TEST PLAN
The design and test of a full scale experimental hydrazine electrolysis
call conducted under Task V of this contract is described in Reference I.
At the and of that program, questions regarding the oparalting safety
limits remained unanswered because the primary effort had been directed
at establishing operating characteristics of the call and identifying
problem areas. The present test program was negotiated as an extension
of the previous contract and consisted of Tasks VII and VIII, The
objectives of these additional tasks were:
Task VII - To determine if a controllability problem exists
in the hydrazine electrolysis process at conditions
greatly in excess of the normal limits of electroly-
sis cell operation.
Task "%,1 1TI - To determine the effects of a short circuit in the
electrolysis cell.
To accomplish these objectives a test plan was formulated which involved
electrolysis cell operations well beyond the normal limits of operatioti,
Appendix A contains the complete Test Plan for Tasks VII and VIII. It
was recognized from the start that some of these tests would be hazardous,
and J-hat a high probability existed that some type of failure would occur
before completion of the program. Hence, all reasonable precautions were
taken to insure the safety of personnel and facility equipment should
hazardous conditions arise during the course of the program. The test
plan included a matrix of all the tests which were planned. The maximum
planned values of test parameters were:
Current - 30 amperes
Voltage - 60 Volts D.C. _	
0
Propellant Temperature 	 300 F
Pressure - 400 prig
To summarize; the Test Plan included these general types of tests:
a,	 High voltage, low current, ambient temperature with neat
hydrazine at three liquid levels in the tank.
b.	 Low Voltage, high current, ambient and 300 OF temperature,
pressure up to 400 psig with electrolyte at required
concentration and with three liquid levels.
C.	 Short circuit tests,
(W	
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ELECTROLYSIS CELT, CONFIGURATION
The cell configuration was the same as that used previously in Task V,
and is described completely in Reference 1. It consists of an electrode
module which is installed inside a Stirveyor propellant tank.
ELECTROLYSIS CELL ASSEMBLY
Before assemblying the call for the tests of Task V11, all component
parts were cleaned in accordance with the 11AC Specification for
processing parts for hydrazine service, and then were ocaled in
clean polyethylene bags until ready to be installed in the unit.
During assembly parts ware handled only with clean lint-free, whito,
gloves,
All parts were those used previously in Task V except for the wick,
0-rings, insulating material and thermocouple, It has been common
practice to replace the wick on each assembly of the cell, because the
wick material is easily frayed by excessive handling. The now wick
was cut from the same piece of material as all previous wicks. New
0-rings of the same compound (Ethylene-Propylene Rubber) as usod
previously were installed. insulating material previously used on
the anode conductor and the inner cell enclosure had been destroyed
when removed for cleaning these parts. New material of the same type
was re-installed, (polyolefin shrinkable sleeving for the anode conductor
insulation and polyethylene film on the inner cell enclosure). The
thermocouple previously used was found to be faulty and was replaced
with a new one of the same type, i.e., enclosed junction iron-contrantan
probe, adjusted in length to sense liquid temperature 0.25 inch below
the electrolysis module.
After completing the assembly of the elect-ode module it was installed in
the tank, and the complete unit was leak tested at 250 psig with nitrogea
gas. A small leak was found at the tank flange joint. Upon investigation
it was found that the tank flange 0-ring had a small cut .  It was replaced
with a new 0-ring. The wick was also replaced, because the first wick [lad
been damaged when the unit was dis-assembled. After re-assembly the tank
was leak-tested again and found to be free of any detectable leakage.
N
to verify absence of short
,)proximately 20 megohms),
to be zero, indicating proper
electrolysis cell was then
leak test and electrolysis
The anode/cathode resistance was checked
c	 7 high (alircuit and was found to be verI "I
The cathode/tank resistance was verified
grounding of the cathode. The assembled
installed in the test chamber for system
testing.
PROOF TEST
Prior to final assembly of the electrolysis cell, the tank shell and flange
closure were proof tested to insure structural integrity at condito,lons
above the expected test conditions. The proof test consisted of heating
the tank, filled with de-ionized water, to 300 + 20°F and applying three
pressurization cycles to 750 psig. This test was performed satisfactorily,
and no adverse effects were noted.
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TEST STAND DESCRUMON
The test chamber was located in an isolated hazardous Lost area as
shown in Figure 1. The electrolysis call/tank assembly was placed
in the chamber as shown in Figures; 2 auft 3 and was connected in ac-
cordance With the schematic diagram of Figure 4, " , he power suppi.y,
along with a voltmeter and a clip-on ammeter shown in Figure 5,
were located in u protected area approximately 50 feet from the
test chamber. The voltmeter and ammeter at this location were used
to monitor voltage and current at the power supply location. The
dat,, acquisition cantor was located approximately 50 feet farther
V!'Pay where all pavameters were read periodically on a digital
Voltmeter and recorded by hand on the data ShCOL. Communication,
by means of two-way intercom, existed between the power supply room
and the data acquisition room,
ELECTROLYSIS TESTS
For the first series of tests, the tank was loaded with 23,50 pounds
of neat hydrazine, which is 90% of the total tank capacity, Loading
was accomplished by evacuating the tank, then transferring propellant
into the tank from a closed container located on a weighing scale.
Propellant transfer is accomplished by pressurizing tile supply con-
tainer with nitrogen to 50 poi.
Voltage Current Survey (Test 713-0
In accordance with the test plan, the first test was a survey of
voltage-current characteristics with the. tank 90% full of neat
hydrazine, At this loading the liquid level was approximately
one inch below the Lop of the anode. The data from this test are
plotted in the upper curve of Figure 6. The infiection and hystersis
in the curve is not unusual and is caused by polari.-ation characLer-
istics of the electrolysis cell and by variation In effective electrode
area due to formation and expulsion of gas bubble^: in the wick/electrode
Interface.
The low resistance value is attributed to a local area of the cathode
screen being in a near short condition with the anode. This is based
on the fact that the distance between cathode and anode is the largest
resistance in the unit and is the only variable large enough to explain
such a low reading.
e lectrolysis at 60V (Test 713-2)
On the day following the voltage-current survey, the first electrolysis
test at high voltage was conducted in accordance with thetest plan.
With the tank still 90% full of neat hydrazine, the voltage was increased
in steps up to 60V. The voltage, current, temperature and pressure
history of this test is shown in Figi,ire 7 & 8. The data acquired during
this test is included in Appendix B.
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N
During this test an unexpected current increase occurred on two occasions,
After 118 minutes of operation it was noted that the current was increasing
and exceeded 10 amperes, This necessitated a reduction of voltage to keep
the current below that value. Later in the test,the current: suddenly
Increased and tripped the 15 ampere circuit breaker on the power supply.
This current surge was coincident with the first vent cycle of the
system relief valve.
These current surges were probable due to the near-short area of the
cathode contacting the anode. It could have been caused by higher
pressure, deformation of the screen at much higher temperatures, or
the action of gas bubbles when the relief valve opened.
C
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FIGURE 2
HYDRAZINE ELECTPOLYSIS
TEST CHAMBER
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Aside from these events the operations of the cell appeared to be
normal throughout this test, however, later analysis of the data
showed that the actual pressure rise during the first 238 minutes of
this test (i,e., up to the tivie the relief valve first vented) was
much greater than could be accounted for by temperature rise and
electrolytic gas generation. For reference purposes the pressure
increase due to these two factors is plotted in Figure 8. For
further discussion of this abnormal. pressure rase and current surges
see	 paragraph on "Failure Investigation".
Voltage-Current Survey (Test 713-3
The next test scheduled was the voltage-current survey up to 60V
with the tank 45% full of neat hydrazinc. Pressure remaining in
the tank from the p%evious day's test was used to expel.l half
(11.75 lb) of the hydrazine which was weighed in a receiver vessel
as it was off-loaded.
After completion of propellant off-loading and leak testing, the
voltage-current sur",ey was started. Voltage was increased in
steps up to 60V, Cell operation appeared normal, and satisfactory.
Data from this test are included in Appendix B, and the current-
voltage data are plotted in the lower curve of Figure 6,
After recording the data on 60V, the voltage was lowered to 40V, data
was recorded there then lowered to 20V. While recording data at 20V, it
was observed that the temperatures were rising very rapidly (see notes
on data sheet in Appendix B). Before the pressure data channel could
be selected to obtain a reading of pressure, the tank ruptured. The
electrolysis cell and test chamber were severelydamaged by the force
of the explosion and the subsequent fire, which was fed largely by the
thermal insulation of the test chamber.
FAILURE, INVESTIGATION
The failure investigation started by noting the location and condition
of all parts of the electrolysis cell which could be found. The notes
made at that time are reproduced in Appendix C.. The photographs of
Figures 9 through 12 show the test chamber and some of the electrolysis
cell parts following the failure. Figure 13 shows all of the cell parts
which could be found arranged on a display table.
Four possible failure modes were considered in the investigation. These
were;
1. Short circuit
2. Electrical arcing
3. Thermal. decomposition
-17-
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4. Chemical reaction (possibly involving changes in com-
patibility of some materials resulting from temperatures
reached in previou6 days testing).
The failure investigation included the following specific tasks:
1. Bxamine identifiable parts and debris from electrolysis
cell, tank,  and test chamber.
2. Analyze tank fragments for evidence of stress corrosion.
3. Examine power supply and clip-on ammeter for evidence
of rialfunction or damage.
4. Investigate reason for erroneous pressure data in previous
day test.
5. Analyze data from Tests 713-2 and 713-3 for clues to cause
of failure.
6. Analyze sample of propellant for same barrel as that used
for test.
7,. Verify that pressurization gas was nitrc,,,en.
8. Investigation possibility of olectrical arcing at 20 and
60 volts.
9. Investigate compatibility of questionable materials at
temperatures up to 2400F.
10. Determine activity of other test station personnel at time
of failure and determine what other electrical equipment
was operating at that time.
11. Review special test results of NASA Goddard flight experiment
electrolysis cell.
Examination of Cell Debris
The following observations were made in the coarse of collecting and
examining the parts and debris from the electrolysis cell:
a. The outer enclosure of the electrode module was bulged out
locally at its lower edge from a high internal pressure.
This was a very local condition. The remainder of the part
was still round and relatively undamaged except for the top
edge being torn out at the attachment screw hole.
b. The inner enclosure of the electrode module was collapsed
inwardly at its lower end from an external force. Some
metal was mission from along one side of the lower e(,'.ge.
c. The lower 1 to 2 inches of the anode were shattered into many
small fragments,but the remainder of the part was still intact.
d. Many pieces of the cell were found scattered on the hillside
up to 20 feet away. Some of these showed damage from heat,
while others did not.
-21-
IThe available evidence indicates that a reaction sufficiently violent
:	 to damage the aluminum inner and outer enclosures and shatter the lower
end of the anode occurred between the inner and outer enclosures. Based
on the orientation of the parts, the location of the reaction was as-
tablished near to the bottom of the cell and also near the surface of
the main body of liquid in line with the cathode connector.
Upon examination in the Power Systems Laboratory the ammeter probe
connector was found to be loose. After tightening this connector,
and de-gaussing the probe, the ammeter could be "zeroed" and appeared
to operate normally although it was reported to be somewhat more
sensitive than the typical ammeter of this type.
The power supply, leads, system grounding, etc. were also examined.
There was no evidence of any damage, malfunction or other discrepancies
which could possibly be related to the cell failure,
Erroneous Pressure Data
During the test of the day preceding the cell failure, erroneous pressure
data had been acquired because of a decimal error in reading pressure on
the digital voltmeter used for displaying all the parameters from this
test, This error'occurred because a single digital voltmeter was used
to display each of the five parameters (voltage, current, tank temperature,
liquid temperature, and pressure) by selecting the desired parameter with
a selector switch. When switching from one parameter to another it was
necessary to mentally relocate the decimal point- because of differing
sensitivity of signal conditioning equipment in the various channels.
This led to confusion and resulted in an error when initially pressurizing
the tank prior to Test 713-2. This error was carried through the rest of
that test and was not detected until the following day when pressurizing
the tank to perform a leak test. These erroneous pressure data were
identified and corrected prior to test 713-3 and hence have no direct
bearing on the failure other than the tank's being exposed to higher
pressures than had been planned on the day before failure occurred.
However, these overpressure conditions still did not exceed the
s':ress-temperature conditions of the proof test.
The cathode electrical connector tab and clamp ring, which hold it to
the electrical feed-through conductor, were found on the hillside
several feet from the test chamber. These parts showed no damage
from heat or electrical. arcing. It must be concluded that they
were blown clear by the force of the explosion and were not involved
in initiating the reaction. The stud which was screwed into the anode
to form an electrical connector attachment was not found, However, half of
the aluminum sleeve which connected this stud to the positive electrical
feed-through was found. The sleeve apparently was broken in the middle
by the force of the explosion with the missing part perhaps still attached
to the anode stud. There was no evidence of electrical damage (arcing
or burning)on the part of the sleeve which was found.
t
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Stress Corrosion Investigation
Sections of the 6Al-4V titanium tank shell we
examination by personnel of the Hughes Aircra
Department, There was no evidence of stress
shelf. defect. The report on this examination
re subjected to metallographie
ft Company Materials Technology
corrosion or any other tank
is included in Appendix C.
Power Supply and Ammeter
The power supply and clip-on ammeter used in the test were examined for
damage and/or evidence of malfunction. These examinations were performed
by personnel of the Hughes Aircraft Company Power Systems Laboratory.
Following the electrolysis cell failure, it was found that the ammeter
could riot be 'zeroed' and that its needle was very slightly bent.
Analysis of Test Data
The raw test data From Tests 713-1, and -2 and -3 are plotted in Figure 6,
7 and 8. These raw data do not show any unusual characteristics or
departure from anticipated performance of the electrolysis cell, at high
voltages. However, as previously reported, the actual, pressure increase
measured during; Test No. 71,3-2 was significantly greater than could be
accounted for. Based on the current-time- temperature history recorded
for that test, the pressure rise due to gas generation by electrolysis
and to temperature rise was calculated as 274 psi. up to the point at
which the relief: valve .First vented. The actual measured pressure rise
during the same time period was 757 psi. Applying the same analysis to the
meager amount of data obtained during Test 713-3 before failure gave a
possible pressure rase of 0.4 psi,whereas the test dp ta showed 7 Psi.
The gas generation rate,when compared to the predicted rate increased with power
level from 150 to 400% during Test 713-2 and to almost 900% immediately
prior to failure in Test 713-3. Possible explanations for thes-,^ dis-
crepancies include;
a. Error in tank ullage volume.
b. Pressure measurement errors.
c. Thermal decomposition.
To account for the pressure discrepancy observed for Test 713-2, the ullage
volume would have to be 3.6%, instead of 10% of the total, tank volume. This
would require an error of 1.7 lbs in the amount of propellant loaded into
the tank. Such an error is highly unlikely since the loaded propellant
weight could be controlled to 0.01 lb,and the loading weight calculations
were verified to be correct. Furthermore,such an ullage error with the
tank 90% full would have completely inadequate to explain the excessive
pressure rise noted in Test 713-3 when the; nominal ullage volume was 55%.
Previous tests at low voltages show very good correlation between actual
pressure rise and the current-time-temperature history of the test.
After correcting the pressure data from Test. 713-2 for a decimal error,
it appears very unlikely that these data could have been in error by
more than about 2%A. When the pressure signal, conditioning equipment
was re-checked by resistance substitution prior to Test 713-3, it was
found to have drafted less than 10 psi in 600 since the previous
calibration 24 hours earlier, The transducer had been calibrated
against a precision pressure gage just prior to Test 7131, two days
before the cell failure. The relief valve venting pressure was indepen-
dently verified by two technicians prior to the start of testing as being
750 psig. Following cell failure the relief valve was chocked again, and
the venting pressure was found to be 740 to 750 psi. The relief valve:
was located in the lower compartment of the test chamber (separated from
the cell by a shelf of 1/2" steel plate) and hence was undamaged by the
explosion and fire. During the Test 713-2 the relief valve: appeared to
vent a 812 psig the first time and subsequently vented and reseated to
maintain pressure between 712 and 805 psig. The relief valve operation
during the tests tend to confirm that the pressure data on Test 713-2 could
not have been in error by more than abou5 50 psi, whereas an error of
almost 500 psi would have been required to explain the high observed
pressure. These factors would seem to eliminate pressure measurement error
as a probable explanation for the excessive pressure rise.
Since the actual gas generation rates disparity increases with predicted
rates significantly with power level, it was concluded that thermal_ de-
composition resulting from high power dissipation is the most probable
source of the pressure discrepancy.
k	
Pi-o ella.nt Analysis
The hydrazine used for this program was supplied by the JPL Edwards AFB
Test Station. A sample from this drum of hydrazine was assayed by the
Hughes Materials Technology Laboratory, A titration technique was used,
and two samples proved to be 99.92% and 99.99% hydrazine. The trace
impurities were not identified.
Pressurization Gas
A sample of gas used for pressurization during these tests was checked
to verify that it was not oxygen. The gas was taken from a compressed
gas cylinder clearly marked "Nitrogen Gas". A sample from this cylinder
failed to support combustion, thus verifying that it was not oxygen but
rather an inert gas.
e
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Electrical Arcinz Tests
In order to evaluate the possibility of an electrical arc being re-
sponsible for initiating a reaction which led to failure of the
electrolysis call, a series of arcing tests were conducted. Tests
were conducted with stainless steel and tungsten electrodes in open
and closed containers with the spark gap above, at, and below the
liquid hydrazine surface at goltages of 20, 40 and 60 volts and at
both room temperature and 160 P. At no time was any sustained
hydrazine decomposition reaction achieved. Only one combination of
test conditions appeared to give even a mild reaction. With tungsten
electrodes touching the hydrazine surface in a closed test tube with
the hydrazine temperature at 155 or' and 60 volts applied, a large
bright blue-green spark was observed, and the cap was blown off the test
tube. however, the reaction appeared localized around the ,park gap
which would indicate that neither the bulk of the liquid nor the bulk
of the vapor were involved in the reaction outside the immediate
locality of the spark. From the results of these tests it is not
conclusive that electrical arcing could have been the initiator of
the reaction which destroyed the electrolysis cell on Test, 713-3.
Compatibility Tests
Because data on the compatibility with hydrazine of several of the
electrolysis cell materials at elevated temperatures was non-existant,
or at least very meager, a series of compatibility tests were initiated.
Materials subjected to these tests were:
a. Irradiated, cross-linked polyolefin heat shrinkable
sleeving used for electrical insulation on the anode
connector.
b. Graphite - Grade ATJ - a fragment from the shattered
area of the electrolysis cell anode.
C,	 Polypropylene - from.same raw stock as used for the
upper and lower anode insulators.
d. Polyethylene film - used as electrical insulation on
outside of inner electrode enclosure to prevent it from
acting as an auxiliary cathode.
e. Strip of 2024-aluminum alloy representative of material
used of inner and outer electrode enclosures and other
parts of the electrolysis cell.
t
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NSpecimens of the above materials were cleaned in accordance with
the appropriate Hughes cleaning specification for hydrazine service.
The specimens were then weighed, placed in glass combustion tubes
partially submerged in hydrazine,and pressurized initially to 5 psig.
The tubes were then placed in a thermal test chamber and subjected
to environmental temperatures of 160, 200 and 240°F for eight hours
each. After each 8 hour exposure, the specimens were examined for
changes in appearance and after 200 and 240°F exposures the specimens
were weighed. Pressure in each tube was monitored and recorded hourly.
None of the specimens exhibited any pressure rise beyond that which
could be attributed to the environmental, temperature.
The test results are summarized below:
a. Polyole£in - After 2000F test, specimen was slightly
whiter and more opaque than the original sample,and
showed a weight gain of 6.4%. After 240°F it was
very white and opaque, had reduced in diameter from
1/4" to 3/16" and showed a total weight gain of 35.8%.
b. Graphite - no change in appearance, weight gain of
0.08%.
C,	 Polypropylene - No change in appearance, weight gain
of 0.297. after 2000  and 0.57% of ter 240°F
 F.
i	 d.	 Polyethylene - After 200°F test, no change in appearance,
._,	 no weight change. After 240 0F, specimen had melted, could
not be removed completely from tube so no weight measure-
ment possible.
e.	 ?024 Aluminum e no change in appearance, weight gain of
0.08% after 240°F test.
Although these tests showed the inadviseability of using polyolefin
and polyethylene in hydrazine at 200°F or above, they
did not yield any conclusive evidence that these materials could have
contributed in any way to the electrolysis cell failure.
These compatibility tests did not include all materials used in the
electrolysis cell. They might well be expanded to investigate 5056
aluminum screen (cathode), glass cloth wick material, the FPR 0-ring
compound,and other materials of construction and be extended to
higher temperatures which may have existed locally in the electrode
area.
Concurrent Activities
It was determined that there was no other test site activity immediately
prior to electrolysis cell failure which conceivably could have contri-
buted to that failure. Personnel not directly involved in the electrolysis
cell test were inspecting and cleaning a propellant servicing cart. The
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only major electrical equipment in operation at the time was the motor
driving a vacuum pump used on the facility altitude chamber, This
motor had been operating continuously and normally for approximately
two hours before cell failure, and it continued normal operation following
the failure. No other equipment was in operation which conceivably could
liave caused a current surge which might have affected cell operation.
NASA Goddard Flight Experiment Testing
As a result of the failure in Test 713-3,. special elevated temperature
and current tests were conducted with the NASA Goddard flight,-- experiment
electrolysis cell, The test data was reviewed as a part of the failure
investigation since it might reveal something significant for the JPI,
uni.:, Two over tests were conducted, The first test called for
operating the unit at 140 0E ambient temperature and; the second test
called for operating the unit at 4 amperes. (Normal operation is 60
to 100 0 F and I amp). The flight experiment unit had no difficulty
operating at 140 0 F since it is a high mass design especially around
the cathode and in outer tank. The bottom of the tank is a flat plat
used for attachment, and it provides good thermal conductance.
The entire unit has not been subjected to 4 amperes. A stainless steel
spring used as the-anode electrical connection was identified as the
weakest component in the unit and it was subjected to 4 amperes. The
spring reached an estimated 200 to 300 0 F,. Thus testing the entire unit
would be unwise. We are currently planning to test the entire unit at
2 amperes. in flight the unit will experience 1/2 to I ampere maximum
and as Further protection a one ampere current limiting device is
contained in the power conditioning circuitry.
Based on this special testing and design differences it was concluded
that the flight experiment is not susceptible to the type of failure
we experienced, The heavy metal cylinder backing up the cathode screen
offers a good heat sink for hot spots. The wick and screen are rolled
away from the anode and back around the same metal cylinder. This pre-
cludes the suspect failure mechanism discussed later.
Summary of Failure Investigation
The facts derived in the failure investigation tend to eliminate the
following factors as possible contributors to the electrolysis cell
failure:
Stress corrosion of the tank shell
Power supply or instrumentation malfunction
Propellant contamination
Pressurant gas contamination
Other concurrent activities at the test site.
The tests which have been conducted to evaluate electrical arcing as
a possible initiator seem to have indicated only a remote possibility
that this could have contributed to the failure.
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A, cathode screen hot-spot is the only mechanism that fits all the evi-
dence. It ,accounts for low resistance in a near-short condition; it
explains the additional gas generation above prediction and why it
_	 increases with higher power; it explains the two current surges as
shorts; and at explains the failure occurring during the second day
rather than the first day, since the area in question is above the
assumed propellant level, in the electrolysis cell as evidenced by the
failed hardware description.
The most probable cause of the near-short condition is the loose edge:
wires on the screen digging into or between the loose weave of the
wick. This condition has occurred at least once before when a low
resistance (5 ohms) was record^d. At normal cell power levels it
would not be a serious problem, Most of the power dissipation would
occur at this point, When the liquid level was above this point, as
in Test 7132, it apparently kept the temperature under control, but
the temperature was stall high enough to decompose hydrazine, When
the liquid level was dropped for Test 713-3 this area quickly heated
out of control.. (5 minutes above 40 volts)
	 The wick retained liquid
to allow current flow,
t
c	
-28-
N
	
-1-F.
^..	 W. tJ. Butcher, W. H. Jones, R. M, Lodwig, N. E. Morgan -
Hydrazine Electrolysis for Spacecraft Propulsion,
Final Report JPL Contract No. 951720, August 1968.
-29-
APPENDIX A
TEST PLAN
v
o
-30-
NW
-7
-r
TEST PLAN
FOR
JPL CONTRACT 951720
Tasks VII and VIII
MARGIN LIMIT TESTS ON
HS-209 HYDRAZINE ELECTROLYSIS CELL
Prepared by:"
r,,.—i4orrgan
Reviewed by:
W. W. Butcher
Approved by:&j*
D. A. Mahaffy
^41
-31-
a ^
CS 31023-400 Processing Pants for Hydrazine
Service.
N, -'W
	
1.0	 INTRODUCTION
',phis document describes the test program to be conducted under Tasks VII
and VIII of JPL Contract 951720 on the ITS•209 Hydrazine Bloctrolysis Coll. Tho,
tests described herein are or a margin limits nature to determine if a control-
lability problem exists in the electrolysis of hydrazine at conditions well
beyond the normal. limits of electrolysis cell operation.
The purpose of this document is to provide information, outline require-
menLS for the Lost program, and describe the general LaSt plan. Detailed Lost
procedures and specific requirements for individual tests will be prepared as
required. All procedures, inspections and tests shall be approved by the
cognizant project engineer.
	
2.0	 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
The following doourm nts are applicable to the extent indicated herein;
2.1
	
Government Documents
MIL-P-265366	 Hydrazine
2.2	 MAC Documents
X3106813
	 Hydrazine Electrolysis Cell,
HS-20').
DP 30929-004	 Specification for Safety of
Personnel and Property in the
Presence of Hydrazine and
Various Passivation Agents.
SSD 803168	 Final Report JPL Contract 951.720
August 1968. Hydrazine Electrolysis
for Spacecraft propulsion.
Contract Brief No. 005	 NS-209 Spacecraft: Attitude Coatrol-
Dated 23 January 1.969
	 Statement of Work for Tasks V11
Reference No. 131183	 and V111 of JPL Contract 951720
3.0	 GENERAL OBJECTIVES
The general objectives of this test program are to:
3.1	 Determine if a controllability problem exists in the hydrazine
electrolysis process at conditions in excess of the normal limits of electrolysis
cell operation.
k
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3.2	 Determine the ^, ffects of, a short circuit in the electrolysis
3.3	 Maintain a record log book of all Task VII and VIII activities.
3.4	 Prepare and submit a Task Report doscribing the test program,
including a discussion of the resalts and conclusions.
	4.0	 SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
The system to be tested consists of a hydrazine electrolysis cell installed
in a propellant tank. The basic arrangement is shown in IIAC Drawing X3106813,
defined in detail by HAC Drawings X3106834 through X3106854 inclusive, and
modi f ied as described in HAC Report SSD 80316R.
	
5.0	 TEST PROGRAM
NOTE: See Figure I for Test System Schematic
5,1	 Tank Safety Tests
5.1-1	 Proof Test - Conduct a hydrostatic proof test of tank shell and
flange closure by pressurizing to 750 psig with GN 
minutes 
the tank shell is heated
to 300 0 F. Apply three proof pressure cycles of 5 i utes duration each.
5.1.2	 Leak Test - Conduct leak test of tank and flange closure using
GN 2 at 200 psig and ambient temperature.
5.2	 Assembly and Check-out
5.2.1	 Clean tank shell and all electrolysis cell parts per CS 31023-400.
5.2.2 ' Assemble electr o lysis cell module as noted is Paragraph 4.0.
5.2.3	 Measure electrical resistance across electrodes to verify
absence of a short circiiit.
5.3	 Controllability Tests (See Test Matrix in Table 1)
Safety Note:
Maximum values of test parameters are as follows:
a. Current: 	 30 amperes
b. Voltage: 	 60 volts D.C.	 0
c. Temperature (Propellant): 300°F
d. Pressure: 400 psig
Simultaneous operation at the above limits is not planned. Tank
pressure may be increased to a maximum of 600 psig if test data indicate a strong
influence of pressure on the electrolysis rate.
AV
0 1
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Testing; shall proceed with caution and tests will be terminated
before the above limits are reached if there is evidence of instability or other
hazard to personnel or equipmcni.
5.3,1	 High Voltage Tests
5.3.1.1	 Install electrolysis cell / tank assembly in test chamber and
load 90% .Gull with neat hydrazine.
5,3.1.2
	 Survey - Conduct a voltage -current survey up to 60V.
5.3.1.3
	 Functional Test - Operate cell at 60V until operating parameters
stabilize. Continue electrolysis for one additional, hoar.
5.3.1.4	 Repeat Paragraph 5.3.1.1, 5 . 3.1.2 and 5 . 3.1.3 with tank 45%
full, of neat N2H4.
5.3.1.5 1^epeat Paragraph 5.3.1.4 with tank 10%Q full of neat N2H4^
5.3.2 High Current, High Temperature Tests
	5.3.2.1
	
Load tank 90% .Full with hydrazine plus 0.5 oxalic acid.
	
5.3.2.2	 Conduct voltage -current survey up to 30 amperes or maximum
attainable with available power supplies if less than 30 amperes.
	
5.3.2.3	 if unable to reach 30 amperes in Paragraph 5.3.2,2, change
electrolyte level as necessary to attain a current of 30 am peres with available
power supplies,
	
5.3.2.4
	
Operate cell at following current 'Levels;
a. 10 amperes
b. 20 amperes
C.	 30 amperes
Allow propellant temperature to stabilize at each current level
and allow pressure to increase over a great enough range to determine if pressure
Level. has a significant affect on electrolysis rate.
	5.3.2.5
	
;f equilibrium temperature in Paragraph 5.3.2.4 at 30 amperes
was less than 300 F, thermally condition test chamber until propellant temperature
reaches 300+ 0 0F. Continue electrolysis for a minimum of one hour or until tank
pressure reaches 400 psig.
	
5.3.2.6
	
Repeat tests of Paragraph 5.3.2.2, 5.3.2.4 and 5.3,2.5 with
Lank 45 `%, full and the electrolyte concentration twice that used in above tests.
	5.3.2.7
	
Repeat test:; of Paragraph 5.3.2.6 with tank 10% u full and
electrolyte concentration 9 times that used in tests of Paragraph 5.3.2.2,
5.3.2.4 and 5.3.2.5.
N5,4	 Short. Circuit Tests
5.4.1	 Short Circuit Below Liquid Levels
5.4.1.1	 Re-build electrolysis cull with the electrodes electrically
short circuited 'by means of a wire betweea the cathode and anode. The short
circuit is to be Located below the liquid level when. the- tank is 907, full.
5.4.1.2	 Load tank 90% full of hydrazine with 0.5% oxalic acid:.
5.4.1.3 With tank at ambient temperature and pressure: of approximately
50 psig, slowly increase voltage applied to cell until short circuit burns out.
Do not exceed limits noted in Paragraph 5.3. Pressure is not to exceed 100 psig
during this test.
5.4.2	 Short Circuit Above Liquid Level
5.4.2.1	 Repeat Paragraph 5.4.1-except;
a. Short circuit is to be located above the 10% full
liquid Level.
b. Tank is to be filled 10% full of hydrazine with
4.5%p oxalic acid.
6.0	 FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS
6.1	 Safety
6.1.1	 Hydrazine - Hydrazine in a very toxic and combustible material
and must be handled with extreme catuion and strictly in accordance of to accepted
procedures. HAC Document DP 30929-004 "Specification for Safety of Personnel. and
Propert;: n the Presence of Hydrazine and Various Passivatxon Agents" shall apply
to this pl ,
 ,rangy.
6.1.2	 Gases - One of the products of hydrazine ,lectrolysis is hydrogen
gas which is highly combustible when mixed with air or is in the presence of other
oxidizers. The requirements for test cell ventilation and absence of sources of
combustion included in the above document (DP 30929-004) relative to hydrazine
shall be equally applicable to hydrogen gas. These requirements shall apply
whenever ther^i is the possibility of hydrogen leakage from the system and when-
ever hydrogen is being vented,
6.1.3	 Pressure Vessels	 The Surveyor 'propellant tanks shell. (HAC
P/N 254094 or P/N 254175) to be used in this program has design burst pressure
of 1050 psi. With a safety factor of 4: 1, the maximum ma -rated operating
pressure is 262.5 psi. The individual tank to be used for the hydrazine electrolysis
cell shall be proof-tested at 750 psi and 300 0F, and subsequently inspected for
damage before use, Whenever a tank is being pressurized it shall be located behind
a suitable barracade. Under no circumstances shall any personnel be on the tank
side of the barr.acade if the tank pressure should exceed 262.5 psi. '
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Should the tank be subjected tz) any shock, blow, be dropped
or otherwise mis-handled, it shall be again proor-tested at 750 psi before
it is used agaift for test purposes.
6.2 Instrumentation and Test Equipment;- The following equipment
is required for performance, of Lt  LaStS described heroin:
Power Supplies - Regulated D,C, NJE Model EQR-10-10
- Sorensen - 6V O 30 amperes
- Kepco - 80V O 8 amperes
Pressure Transducer 0-500 psi
Thermocouples - 0-300 0F, Chromel-Alumel, immersion Type
Thermistor - 0 -3000F (Tang shall temperature)
Recorder - Periodically sample data on voltage, current.,
pressure and temperature.
Solenoid Valves
Hand Valves (6)
Lines,	 Fittings, Etc.
Test Chamber - Enclosed,	 insulated, heated to 3000
 F.
6.3 General Facility Requirements - General Facility requirements
include the following:
Hydrazine - To be supplied by JPL
Solvents - IPA, Freon, Etc.
Nitrogen
Helium
Distilled, de-ionized water
Propellant loading and disposal facilities
Safety Equipment
Recorder Paper
Other equipment, facilities, supplies normally
required for hydrazine propulsion system testing.
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Test
No.
Propellant
Quantity
°/a*'u I 1
Electrolyte
Conc.
11/1,
Voltage
volts
Current
Amps
Propellant
Tem 8 cratureF
Pressure
PSIG
Remarks
1 1000/1, Water - - 300 750 Tank shell proof
test
2 90% 0 0-60 5 Arab 300 Survey - Neat N2114
3 90% 0 60 5 Amb 50-200 Cell operation at
60V
4 45 0 0-60 5 Amb 100 Survey
5 45 0 60 5 Amb 50-200 Cell operation at
60V
10 0 0-60 5 Anib 100 Survey
7 10 0 60 5 Amp 50"200 Cell. operation at
60V
8 90 0.5 0-10 0-:30 Amb 100 Survey with 57
Electro
9 90 0.5 A/R 10 Amb 50-200 High Curr(-,.-nt Tests
A/R 20 Amb 50200 at ambient temp.
A/R 30 Amb, 50-200
10 90 0.5 A/R 30 300 50-400 Heat test chamber
11 45 1.0 0-10 0-30 Amb, 100 Survey
12 45 1.0 A/R 10 Amb 50-200
20 Aiiib 50-200
30 Amb 50-200
13 45 1.0 A/R 30 300 50-400
14 io 4.5 0-10 0-30 &nib 100 Survey
15 10 4.5 A/R 10 Am" - 50-200
20 Aido 50-200
30 Amb 50-200
16 10 4.5 A/R 30 3000E 50-400
17 90 0.5 A/R A/R Amb 50 max Short circuit test
18 10 4.5 A/R A/R Amb, 50 max Short circuit test
-37-
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TABLE I
ITS-209 HYDRAZINE ELECTROLYSIS
TEST MATRIX
M
Vac
Insulated
Test
Chamber
p-----
Heater
Propellant
Fill
is
f
c
f--® Hand Valve
Solenoid Valve
O
Temperature Sensor
LJ
Pressure.Transducer
Test System Schematic
Figure l
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Test No. 713-2	 4/30/69
Tank 90% Full of Neat Hydrazine
Time	 volts	 Current - Am2s	 Tank 0	 Liquid 0	 PressureSimpson Digital	 Clip-on Digital Temperature F Temperature F
	
psig
multi- volt-
	
Ammeter	 Vol t+-
me tier 	 meter	 motor
1018 10.0 10.27 1.15
Cell Off
1038 1010 - 1.18 - 5511 60 5.5
1042 20.0 21.24 2.80 - 55.3 60 5.6
1045 40.0 41-79 6.4 - 55.6 62 6.0
1050 40.0 41-75 8.2 - 55.9 64 7.0
1055 40,2 42.06 7.5 - 56.5 66 810
1110 40.4 42-48 6.35 - 60.0 69 10.3
1112 50.0 51.70 7.45 - 61.4 70 1111
1120 50.1 51-95 6.70 - 64.3 73 12.4
1122 59 61.20 8.0 - 65,3 73 12.9
1125 59 61.37 7.6 - 67.0 75 14.0
1130 59 61-51 7.1 - 70.0 77 15.0
1145 59 61.84 6.1 - 79.7 82 18.8
1.200 60 62.12 6.0 6.27 88.6 88 22.4
1215 60 61-97 6.4 6.62 99.4 97 27.2
1,230 59 61-47 8.0 8.16 110.2 107 33.6
**1235 40.1 42.37 9.2 9.20 113.6 ill 35,0
1245 41 42.95 6.95 7.30 125.8 122 38.8
1100 41,5 43*44 5,65 5,85 137,2 125 42*4
1302 50 51.53 6.75 7,0 138.5 128 43.1
1315 50 51,76 6.40 6.65 145.2 130 48.0
1330 50 51.60 6.85 7.08 153.1 138 53.8
1345 50 51.52 7.10 7.36 160.3 143 59.9
1.400 50 51,58 6.9 7.22 166.2 148 67.3
1402 58 60.23 8.4 8.65 167.4 150 68.9
1407 58 59.97 9.3 9.40 170.1 155 74.4
1415 58 59.98 9.0 9.27 176,3 166 79.8
1.430 58 60.19 7,8 8.21 185.7 178 81.2
1435 P/S Circuit breaker tripped (15 amp)
1438 0 0 0 0 191.4 167 75.6
1445 25 26,42 8.6 8.40 191.3 176 71.8
1454 25 26.37 8.3 8.58 192.0 178 72.5
1515 25.5 27.08 6.2 6.53 193.3 178 71.2
1516 30.0 31.96 7.3 7.50 195.1 177 71.8
1530 30.5 _32.25 6.3 6.46 195.5 178 72.3
1.532 40 42,36 8.5 8.72 196.3 178 73.2
1540 - 42.55 - 8.33 198.0 179 78.0
1550 40.8 42.65 7.65 7.98 199.6 181 80.5
1552 0 0 0 0 199.8 180 78.8 
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Test No. 713-2 (continued)
Note:
Multiply pressurereodings by 10 to got true pressure (i.e. rinal
pressure was 788 psi not 78.8 psi), This was due to mislocated
decimal on digital volt meter readout of pressure.
Between 1230 and 1235 current exceeded 10 amps. Voltage was lowered
to 40V to reduce current below 1Q amps.
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c Test No. 713-3	 5/l/69
Voltage-Current Survey Tank 45% Full oE Neat Ilydrazinu
Time volts Currunt-Amps Tank Liquid
Simpson Digital Clip-on Digital Temperature TempgraLure Pressure
multi- volt- Ammo ter Volt- or F paig
meter meter meter
0958 0 0 0 0 54,4 59 52
0959 1.1 .050 - - -
1000 211 - .150 - - - -
1001 5.2 5.50 .4o .32 54.3 59 53
1009 5.4 5.65 .29 •26 54.5 59 52
1010 10.0 10.23 .42 .42 54.6 59 54
1013 20.0 21.28 1.00 1.00 54.6 59 53
1015 30.0 32.40 1.1 1.15 54.7 59 54
1016 40.0 42.30 1.53 1.59 54.7 59 54
1017 50.0 51.97 2.0 2.05 5154.7 59 54
1018 60.0 62,42 2.7 2.67 54.8 60 57
1019 40 42.18 1.7 1.74 54.8 61 59
1020 20 20-56 1.12
Clip-on ammeter was still reading 1.1 amp after temperature rise was first
observed.
130 to 150 0F and rising rapidly
Read as 810 OF and rising rapidly
Tank ruptured before pressure data could be read.
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FATTAIRE INVESTIGATION
Notes on Location and Condition of Electrolysis
CColl Parts
"Dome" - Found about 10 feet from test chamber. Had been dented
on top from impact with solid object, probably Lop of chamber.
Set screw was still ir, tl viiw- had been stripped out of top of
outer shall, Dome still contained gas traisfur tube and part
of control support tube which fractured through radial gas outlet
parts.
2.	 Anode - Found on ground Just below chamber With lower 1 to 2 inches
missing, Fragments of anode were found scattered on hillsida up to
approximately 20 feet; 	 chamber.
3.	 Cathode Screen - A piece appr
outer shell. A few fragments
hillside including piece with
found on hillside showed only
lower part of the large:
was damaged by heat (probably
oximately 7 1 ' x 7 11 was still inside
of cathode screen were found on
electrical connector Lab. Fragments
slight offects cfheat: while the
remalning inside the outer shell
in resulting fire).
4. Wick - Part of wick approximately 7" x 7 11 was found inside the
outer shell along With the cathode. The lower edge was badly
blackened by the: 	 A small '' I x I" piece of wick was found
about 10 fact away on the hillside, it showed no evidence of heat,
was only very slightly dirty from exposure,
5. Outer shall (2 1/2" dia, tube) - Remained in test chamber, was
blackened by fire. Set screw attaching outer shell to dome had
stripped out longitudinally. At lower edge, a section about I"
wide was bulgecl out tearing away some of the metal from off the
edge of the part.
6. Inner Shell - Lower end (about 3 11 length) was collapsed inward from
an external force. At bottomt  edge, 3/4 11 was missing over 180 OF of
circumference. inside surface was very clean in lower end of part;
upper part slightly discolored inside. Outside surface was badly
blacked from fire except top 2 11 to 411,
7. Screen Compartments - Fragments, probably from top compartment
found on hillside, no heat damage. One of the three lower
compartment, with cup part missing, was found on ground at base
of test chamber near anode. This was probably the top section
of the large screen compartment and showed no heat damage.
Another section of screen from the large screen compartments
was found inside, protruding slightly, the inner shell. This
was probably the center compartment. A third section of screen
was found wedged in a crack in the tank shell which remained
attached to the tank flange. This was probably the lower compartment.
Both of these latter were badly discolored from heat. Fragments of
screen found on hillside were mostly free of heat discoloration, but
4t,	 a few small pieces showing heat damage were also found.
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8,,	 Central support tube - Main part of tube i.,-as found still inside
inner. shall. Tube fractured at top face of jam nut locking it
to flange closure. Tabe also fractured at 4 radial gas outlet
ports inside top screen compartment. Section of tube above these
holes was still atLachod to dome. Part above dome was sheared
off, flattened.
9. Teflon Spacers - lower spacer was still on tube, badly damaged by
heat. Middle spacer still on tube blackened by fire - but displaced
upward 2". Top long spacer was found on ground near anode. Short
flanged spacer was round on hillside. Both top spacers were un-
damaged by heat.
10. insulators - Top - Two pieces each about 90 0 qudrant found on
hillside.
Bottom - Several small pieces badly damaged by
heat, unidentified,
11. Tank Flange Closure - Discolored by heat but no evidence of
electvi cal damage, arcing, etc, Three screws holding flange
closure to tank had heads popped off.
12. Electrical Contiectors - Anode - Found part of aluminum sleeve to
connect feed through connector to stud screwed into anode.
it showed no heat damage but was broken in middle, only
one half found.
Cathode - Found connector attaching feedthrough conductor
to tab on cathode screen, Neither it nor tab nor feed-
through we r. damaged by heat except for feedthrough damaged
by resulting fire.
13. Missing Parts:
a. Ano0c electrical connector stud.
b. Identifiable parts of lower insulator.
c. One-half of upper insulator
d. 0-ring from bottom of outer shod.
e. Identifiable parts of upper screen compartment.
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